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TRAPPED IN A TANGLED WEB 
UNITED STATES V. LARA: THE TROUBLE 
WITH TRIBES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY 
DEBACLE 
MacKenzie T. Batzer* 
Stretched across the upper part of the doorway was a big spiderweb, 
and hanging from the top of the web, head down, was a large grey 
spider.  She was about the size of a gumdrop.  She had eight legs . . . 
“I’m not as flashy as some . . . but I’m near-sighted.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Indigenous peoples have been present on United States soil 
even before the nation became independent.  When the 
Europeans came to the country and attempted to colonize the 
Indigenous peoples, conflict inevitably arose, and the colonizers 
were victorious in transforming tribes from self-governing bodies 
abundant with rich traditions and cultural innovations to timid 
groups at the mercy of white settlers.  The transformation 
“manifested itself through tremendous loss of life and land” and 
established a “boundary line between the Indigenous and colonial 
societies.”2  Relations between Indian tribes and the United 
States government have continued to be unstable and ill-defined 
since colonization.  The status of Indian tribes relative to the 
federal government has been difficult to characterize because 
tribes do not possess the same sovereign power as the states.3 
Indians and Indian reservations make up a larger portion of 
the United States than most people realize.  In Washington, 
 
* JD/MBA candidate, 2007, Chapman University School of Law and Chapman University 
Argyros School of Business & Economics, Orange, California.  Thank you to Professor 
Timothy A. Canova of the Chapman University School of Law for all of your guidance.  
Thank you to Dr. Theodore, Dorothy, Zoe, Bree, Theo, and the Honorable James M. 
Batzer, Tive Robertson, and last but most certainly not least, Rose Batzer.  All of you 
mean the world to me.  Thank you for everything. 
 1 E.B. WHITE, CHARLOTTE’S WEB 36-37 (Harper & Row, Inc. 1952), 
 2 Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
75, 78 (2002). 
 3 See generally Alexander Reichert, Counsel for Billy Jo Lara, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
285 (2003/2004). 
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Oregon, and Idaho alone, there are forty-two federally recognized 
tribes that occupy over 5.6 million acres of land.4  Washington 
tribes employ 15,000 Indian and non-Indian people.5  Indian 
reservations across the United States generate $246 million in 
tax revenue each year for state and local governments, in 
addition to $4.1 billion in tax revenue for the federal 
government.6  Additionally, there are over 250 tribal courts in 
the United States today.7 
Given the increasing financial power and political influence 
of Indian tribes and the growing impact they have on non-Indian 
citizens, it is becoming increasingly important to identify Indian 
tribes’ roles within the United States.  That is, what civil or 
criminal control do Indian tribes have over their own members, 
over other Indians who are not members of their tribes, and over 
non-Indians?  Additionally, what powers do Indian tribes possess 
under the laws of the federal government?  Moreover, if Congress 
and the United States Supreme Court have the authority to 
make and to interpret law with regard to Indian tribes, then to 
what extent are Indian tribes sovereign? 
Before colonization, Indian tribes were self-governing.  
However, after Europeans arrived in the New World, they began 
to introduce, and in many cases force, their values onto the 
Indians.  Tribes were stripped of some of their power, and 
Indians began the struggle to preserve their own beliefs, 
cultures, and ways of life.  While some Indians welcomed change 
and facilitated interaction between tribes and European 
colonists, and while some Indigenous peoples and Europeans 
believed both groups were on equal footing, most Europeans 
believed they were superior to the Indians.8  Conflicting views 
among the colonists and the Indigenous peoples “resulted in the 
weakening, and in some cases, the extinction, of the Indigenous 
peoples, and the commensurate empowerment of the colonizing 
peoples.”9 
Even though colonists, and eventually the United States 
Supreme Court and Congress, began referring to Indian tribes as 
“sovereign,” their actions with regard to the tribes speak louder 
than words.  The acknowledgment of tribes as sovereign 
 
 4 Dan Murdock, Ethical Implications in Indian Law, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 313, 313 
(2003/2004). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 313-14. 
 7 Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts:  Applying the Myths and the 
Methods of Marbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts’ Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
77, 103-04 (2004). 
 8 Porter, supra note 2, at 79. 
 9 Id. at 78. 
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“increasingly looks like lip service,”10 while Congress’ plenary 
power over tribes serves “as a continuing reminder that the 
United States controls the Indian nations, very much like the 
way prison guards serve as a constant reminder to the convicts 
that they are not staying at the Holiday Inn.”11 
Arising out of this sovereignty debacle is the question of 
what constitutes a separate sovereign for purposes of Double 
Jeopardy in criminal prosecution.  A recent Supreme Court 
decision attempts to clarify the issue, but only muddies the 
waters.  United States v. Lara12 demonstrates Congress’ and the 
Supreme Court’s continued refusal to truly recognize Indian 
tribes as sovereigns.  Part I of this note reviews the history of 
Indian tribal relations with the United States government that 
has given rise to the present status of Indian tribes.  Part II of 
this note discusses the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, its 
subsequent 1990 amendment, and the implications of this 
amendment on Indian tribes’ rights to criminally prosecute their 
own members as well as nonmember Indians.  Part III of this 
note summarizes United States v. Lara, examines the issue of 
tribal sovereignty in the context of Lara, and analyzes the 
implications of the Court’s decision on the future of tribal 
sovereignty. 
I HISTORY OF INDIAN TRIBAL RELATIONS WITH THE  
UNITED STATES 
A. What is Indian Country? 
Spiders catch their prey with their legs and use their fangs to 
inject poison. 
“The relation of the Indians to the United States is marked 
by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else.”13  
King George’s Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the first instance 
in which the term “Indian country” was used to separate Indian-
inhabited land from land owned by the colonists.14  Of course, 
this was also an effort to by the government to gain centralized 
control over Indigenous peoples by segregating them from white 
settlers.15  Still, the Crown understood that any person who 
 
 10 Id. at 84. 
 11 Id. at 86. 
 12 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 13 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831). 
 14 Joseph D. Matal, A Revisionist History of Indian Country, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 283, 
289 (1997). 
 15 Id. 
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ventured into “Indian country” did so at his own risk.16 
After the United States became independent, it preserved 
the concepts of Indian country and centralized control because 
the government’s goal was to “prevent Indian uprisings and 
preserve the peace along the frontier.”17  The United States 
concocted the first formal definition of “Indian country” through 
the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1796.18  It amended the 
Act in 1834 to include a newer, more accurate definition of Indian 
country after treaties and Indian removal rendered the borders 
set by the 1796 Act obsolete.19  The new, but perhaps 
unimproved, definition characterized Indian country as: 
[A]ll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not 
within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of 
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the 
Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the Indian title 
has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this act, be taken and 
deemed to be the Indian country.20 
The government continued to push Indian tribes westward 
and away from white settlers and citizens, and subsequently 
decided to settle the Indians on reservations within new states.21  
In 1874, the Indian Intercourse Act was repealed.22  However, 
since the government moved Indian tribes within state borders, 
it was inevitable that conflicts between states and the tribes 
would develop.23  Therefore, Congress decided to make Indian 
reservations “enclaves of exclusive federal jurisdiction” by 
requiring cessation of state jurisdiction over Indian land.24 
One of the first cases in which the Supreme Court attempted 
to define Indian country was Ex Parte Crow Dog.25  In Crow Dog, 
the Supreme Court characterized Indian country as all territory 
“‘to which the Indian title has not been extinguished,’ and which 
were either outside ‘the exterior geographical limits of a state’ or 
‘excepted from its jurisdiction . . . at the time of its admission.’”26 
As Indian country and state territory continued to collide, 
the government passed the General Allotment Act of 1887, a 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Mashpee Tribe v. Watt, 542 F. Supp. 797, 803 (D. Mass. 1982) (citing Mohegan 
Tribe v. State of Conn., 638 F.2d 612, 621 (2nd Cir. 1980)). 
 18 4 Cong. Ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469 (1796).  See also Matal, supra note 14, at 290. 
 19 23 Cong. Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).  See also Matal, supra note 14, at 290. 
 20 Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 734. 
 21 Matal, supra note 14, at 290.  See, e.g., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 
U.S. 60 (1962). 
 22 Matal, supra note 14, at 291. 
 23 Id. at 295. 
 24 Id. at 293. 
 25 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 26 Matal, supra note 14, at 301 (quoting Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 561). 
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comprehensive piece of legislation allowing Indians fractional 
interests in land.27  The General Allotment Act, also known as 
the Dawes Act, gave the President the power to allocate tribal 
lands to individual Indians.28  Under the original General 
Allotment Act, Indians could purchase plots of 160 acres, and 
white settlers could purchase any left over land.29  However, the 
allotments were held in trust by the United States for a 
minimum of twenty-five years.30  After the Supreme Court 
decision in another case involving tribes, In re Heff31, and several 
subsequent revisions of the General Allotment Act, the Indian 
Reorganization Act ended the allotment policy in 1934.32  
However, the General Allotment Act had far-reaching adverse 
consequences on the treatment of Indian country and tribal 
sovereignty because “the Court no longer considered tribal 
governments to exist, and it no longer viewed Indian lands as 
having unique jurisdictional status.”33 
In 1948 the United States codified the definition of Indian 
country: 
[T]he term “Indian country” . . . means (a) all land within the limits of 
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all 
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United 
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory 
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all 
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been 
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.34 
Following this codification, there was a plethora of court 
cases that sought to interpret the term “Indian country,” focusing 
on a variety of factors.  It seemed as if neither courts nor 
Congress had a consistent idea of what Indian country was, or 
what jurisdiction Indians or the government had over crimes 
committed in Indian country. 
 
 27 See generally FELIX COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
(Rennard Strickland & Charles F. Wilkinson eds., Michie 1982), for an overview of several 
sections of the General Allotment Act and other pieces of legislation affecting it, as well as 
a comprehensive history of Indian relations with the government. 
 28 Matal, supra note 14, at 306 (citing Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 
Stat. 388 (1887)). 
 29 Id. (citing 24 Stat. 388, 390). 
 30 COHEN, supra note 27, § 2.C. 
 31 197 U.S. 488 (1905). 
 32 Matal, supra note 14, at 307. 
 33 Id. 
 34 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948). 
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B. Trouble at the Court 
The poison contains an agent that assists in dissolving the 
prey so the spider can consume it. 
Since the Constitution gives very little guidance on Congress’ 
power to regulate Indian affairs, in early cases the Supreme 
Court was forced to look outside the Constitution to make 
decisions about the power of Indian tribes to own and use land, 
their status as sovereigns, and their self-governance.  Three 
cases that have come to be known as the “Marshall trilogy” 
provided yet another Supreme Court interpretation of the status 
of Indian tribes in the United States.35 
In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the plaintiffs, British subjects and 
their heirs, claimed title to property conveyed to them by the 
Indians.36  The defendants, on the other hand, received their title 
directly from the United States government.  Both claimed that 
their title was superior.37  The Court concluded that even though 
Indian tribes held title to land, the United States had superior 
title.38  Therefore, the white settlers who had title conveyed by 
the U.S. government were permitted to purchase and sell the 
land, while tribes retained only the right to occupy and use it.39 
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court held that Indian 
tribes were “domestic dependent nations.”40  However, the Court 
at the same time acknowledged that tribal self-government was 
important, laying the foundation for future conflicts over tribal 
autonomy.41  The following year, in Worcester v. Georgia, the 
Court held that Georgia state laws did not have an effect within 
Cherokee Nation territorial boundaries and referred to tribes as, 
“distinct, independent political communities, retaining their 
original natural rights.”42  Through this language, the Court 
again appeared to express the importance of tribal self-
governance.43  Unfortunately, neither the Court nor the 
government expounded on what they believed these “original 
 
 35 See generally Frank Pommersheim, Native Americans and the Constitution: Is 
There a (Little or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing In Indian Law?: A Brief 
Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271 (2003). The three cases, Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat.) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester 
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), are known as the “Marshall trilogy” because the 
opinions in each were delivered by Justice Marshall.  Id. 
 36 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 571-605. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
 41 Pommersheim, supra note 35, at 275. 
 42 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559. 
 43 Pommersheim, supra note 35, at 275. 
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natural rights” to be. 
Clearly, issues of Indian tribal sovereignty and tribes’ 
relationships to the government were abundant.  In Ex Parte 
Crow Dog, the Supreme Court not only sought to define Indian 
country but also sought to determine whether federal statutes 
and treaties had extended criminal jurisdiction to cover crimes 
committed by one Indian against another in Indian territory.44  
Crow Dog was convicted of murdering Spotted Tail, an Indian 
from a different tribe.45  The murder took place in Sioux territory, 
but under Sioux law Crow Dog’s punishment would have been 
limited to his support of Spotted Tail’s family.46  The Court’s 
opinion in Ex Parte Crow Dog addressed the issue specifically in 
reference to Sioux territory, but the opinion had a farther-
reaching impact because of its holding and broad language.  
While the Court held that federal courts did not have jurisdiction 
to hear intra-state Indian criminal affairs, the Court thought 
that Indians should be judged, “by the customs of their people 
[and] the law of their land,” and vacated Crow Dog’s federal 
conviction.47  There was such a public outcry following this 
decision that Congress passed the Indian Major Crimes Act, 
under which Indians who committed serious felonies, even within 
Indian territory, could be tried in federal court.48 
Three years later, in United States v. Kagama, the Court 
upheld Congress’ ability to enact the Indian Major Crimes Act 
and reaffirmed the notion that states did not have legislative 
power over Indian tribes, because the federal government had 
that power.49  Kagama has come to be known as the foundation of 
Congress’ plenary power over Indian tribes.50  The Court stated 
that the “power of the general government over these remnants 
of a race once powerful”51 is broad and plenary because “it alone 
can enforce its laws on all the tribes.”52 
 
 44 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 45 Id. at 557. 
 46 Matal, supra note 14, at 303 (citing COHEN, supra note 27, at § 4.A). 
 47 Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571-72. 
 48 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000).  See also Matal, supra note 14, at 303.  The original 
version of the Indian Major Crimes Act allowed for federal prosecution of Indians for 
seven named offenses committed throughout organized territories and on Indian 
reservations.  Today, the Act provides for federal prosecution of fourteen named offenses 
committed within Indian country.  18 U.S.C. § 1153.  These offenses include, but are not 
limited to, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, incest, assault with intent to 
commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily 
injury, assault against an individual under 16 years of age, arson, burglary, and robbery.  
Id. 
 49 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886). 
 50 Matal, supra note 14, at 305. 
 51 118 U.S. at 384. 
 52 Id. at 385. 
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In the mid-to-late 1900s, the issue of tribal sovereignty again 
began to mix with the issues of criminal prosecution and 
jurisdiction.  In Ophilant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the 
Supreme Court held that tribal governments had lost inherent 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, and stated that when tribal land 
became part of United States territory, Indian tribes’ rights as 
completely independent, sovereign nations were diminished.53  
However, the Court left open the question of whether tribes had 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. 
II. DURO V. REINA AND THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968 
“I always give them a little anesthetic so they won’t feel pain.  
It’s a little service I throw in.”54 
In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act 
(ICRA).55  Also known as the Indian Bill of Rights, the ICRA 
imposes certain constitutional restrictions upon Indian tribal 
governments and guarantees Indians’ basic civil rights.56  The 
ICRA also requires that defendants in tribal court be accorded 
most of the protections that the Constitution extends to 
defendants in state and federal court, and provides for federal 
habeas review of tribal court convictions.”57  Additionally, the 
ICRA guarantees tribal members equal protection.58 
The 1968 version of the ICRA repeatedly uses the phrase 
“any person” in connection with its various sections.  The original 
interpretation of the Act, however, was not meant to imply that 
“Indian tribes can exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.”59  
A turning point for tribes everywhere took place with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Duro v. Reina and Congress’ actions 
after the Court handed down its decision.60  The events in Duro 
took place on the Salt River Indian Reservation just east of 
Scottsdale, Arizona.61  Albert Duro was an enrolled member of a 
different tribe, the Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission 
Indians.62  Between March and June 1984, he resided on the Salt 
River Indian Reservation with a female companion who was a 
 
 53 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
 54 E.B. WHITE, supra note 1, at 48. 
 55 25 U.S.C.. §§ 1301 et. seq. (1968). 
 56 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indians § 13. 
 57 Brief for the United States at 34, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (No. 
03-107) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1968)). 
 58 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1968). 
 59 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indians § 13 (West 2004). 
 60 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
 61 Id. at 679. 
 62 Id. 
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member of the Salt River Tribe.63  In June 1984, Duro shot and 
killed a fourteen-year-old boy on the Salt River Reservation.64  
The boy was a member of the Gila River Indian Tribe.65  Duro 
was placed in custody and taken to stand trial in tribal court.66  
However, at that time, the tribal court was limited to imposing 
criminal penalties only up to six months imprisonment and a 
$500 fine, because the court’s powers were regulated by federal 
statute.67  The tribal court charged Duro with illegal firing of a 
weapon on the reservation pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights 
Act authorizing tribes to exercise jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians, and Duro moved to have the prosecution dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction.68 
After the tribal court denied his motion, Duro filed a petition 
for habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona.69  The District Court granted the writ, and 
held that if the tribe asserted jurisdiction over Duro, a 
nonmember, it would violate the equal protection rights afforded 
Indians by the ICRA.70  A divided panel of the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that “if Congress had 
intended to divest tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians they would have done so.”71  Judge Sneed, 
dissenting from the panel opinion, argued that giving a tribal 
court jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian would subject him to 
“impermissible racial classification” and there would be a 
“potential for bias” by a tribal court that consisted of Indians 
with whom Duro was not necessarily affiliated.72  The panel 
opinion and the dissenting opinion were subsequently revised; 
however, during the revision period, the Eighth Circuit in 
Greywater v. Joshua held that tribal courts did not possess 
inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.73  The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to help resolve 
the conflict between the Eighth and Ninth Circuit decisions.74  
The Supreme Court went on to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, concluding that “Indian tribes lack jurisdiction over 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 679. 
 66 Id. at 681. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 681. 
 71 Id. at 683. 
 72 Id. at 684. 
 73 846 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 74 Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1987), cert granted, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989), 
and rev’d by 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
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persons who are not tribe members.”75 
A. Tribal Pandemonium 
“‘Will you walk into my parlour’ Said a spider to a fly; ‘Tis 
the prettiest little parlour that ever you did spy.’”76 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Duro prompted outcry from 
Indian tribes across the nation.77  Before the Duro decision, tribes 
had been exercising criminal jurisdiction over all Indians, 
including members and nonmembers, for over 200 years, and the 
United States had recognized the exercise of this jurisdiction.78  
Additionally, pursuant to the Indian Major Crimes Act, 
the United States has asserted exclusive jurisdiction over certain 
specified major crimes committed in Indian country by an Indian 
against another Indian.  This provision excludes state jurisdiction and 
may also exclude concurrent tribal jurisdiction . . . .Section 1152 [the 
Indian Country Crimes Act] establishes exclusive Federal jurisdiction 
over all other general crimes except over crimes committed in Indian 
country by an Indian against another Indian.  The section recognizes 
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribal government over such crimes.79 
The decision in Duro, however, “established an arbitrary line 
by differentiating between members and nonmembers instead of 
American Indians and non-American Indians.”80  In reaching its 
conclusion, the Duro court did not address the history of relations 
between Indian tribes.81  Indian tribes quickly pointed out that 
nonmember Indians play a sizeable role in the activities of other 
tribes and in the lives of other Indians; nonmember Indians are 
valued members of the community.82  In addition, the Arizona, 
South Dakota, Nevada, North Dakota, and Montana legislatures 
called upon Congress to reaffirm Indian tribal jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians who commit misdemeanors on host 
reservations.83 
In response to this outcry, Congress used its plenary power 
to amend the Indian Civil Rights Act.  This amendment is 
 
 75 Duro, 495 U.S. at 685. 
 76 Mary Howitt, The Spider and the Fly, in SKETCHES OF NATURAL HISTORY 128, 128 
(Effingham Wilson, London 1834). 
 77 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, American-Indian Law: United States v. Lara: Affirmation 
of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over Nonmember American Indians, 83.7 MI B. J. 24 
(2004). 
 78 S. REP. NO. 102-153, at 1 (1991). 
 79 Id. at 3.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). 
 80 Fletcher, supra note 77, at 25. 
 81 S. REP. NO. 102-153, at 2 (1991). 
 82 Fletcher, supra note 77, at 25 (citing Carole Goldberg-Amberose, Of Native 
Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 1123 (1994)). 
 83 S. REP. NO. 102-153, at 2 (1991). 
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commonly called the “Duro fix” and restores the power of Indian 
tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians for crimes committed on 
their tribal land.  The fix was supported by all of the tribes that 
testified before Congress prior to Congress amending the Act.84  
Through the Duro fix, Congress appeared to recognize that tribes 
need more power over events that occur within their borders.  
Indians who commit crimes on reservations of which they are not 
members will be subject to criminal prosecution “by the host 
tribal government in the same manner that they would be 
subject to prosecution by the United States for major crimes 
committed on Indian lands.”85  The Act, as amended, defines 
“Indian” as “any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States as an Indian under section 1153, title 18, 
United States Code [the Indian Major Crimes Act], if that person 
were to commit an offense listed in that section in Indian country 
to which that section applies.”86 
Given the Congressional history and the plain language of 
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 as amended, it seems 
appropriate to conclude that Congress was reinvesting Indian 
tribes with a power they already had: the power to prosecute all 
Indians who commit crimes on tribal land.  This was an 
optimistic piece of legislation for Indian tribes in that they felt 
that a right they once had as a result of their inherent sovereign 
powers had been restored, and they would be able to enforce laws 
against nonmember Indians that may not otherwise be enforced 
in any other court.87 
Around the time of the 1990 Duro decision and Congress’ 
subsequent fix, tribes began to put forth even more of a concerted 
effort to make their voices heard, realizing if they did not, their 
past efforts could be thwarted and subsequent pleas may fall on 
deaf ears.  Attempting to help themselves, the already-existing 
Native American Rights Fund, in conjunction with the National 
Congress of American Indians, formed the Tribal Supreme Court 
Project, which allows tribes to pool their resources in order to 
respond to the Supreme Court and Congress in a way which may 
help give them a voice that others can hear.88  This effort 
developed a network of “attorneys and academics to share legal 
information and experience,” which has helped ensure that the 
Supreme Court hears the best possible arguments in favor of the 
 
 84 Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that Overturned It: A 
Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 768 (1993). 
 85 S. REP. NO. 102-153, at 2 (1991). 
 86 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1990). 
 87 Fletcher, supra note 77, at 25. 
 88 Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. 
REV. 5, 16 (2004). 
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tribes when it opts to consider questions impacting Indian tribes 
and tribal relations.89 
III. THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY: UNITED STATES V. LARA 
“In the spider-web of facts, many a truth is strangled.”90 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Duro, Congress 
amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to reaffirm Indian tribes’ 
jurisdiction over all Indians.  Congress’ actions raise several 
important issues.  First, by amending the Act to overrule the 
Supreme Court, Congress presumed that the Duro decision was 
based on federal common law rather than on constitutional 
grounds.91  Second, by “reinvesting” tribes with a jurisdictional 
power the tribes presumed they retained all along, Congress 
acted as if tribes were not truly sovereign nations.  Third, 
Congress’ actions indicate that “tribes lost all power over persons 
other than members at conquest and whatever powers tribes 
have are the result of affirmative federal government grants.”92 
This view of “delegated sovereignty” is an oxymoron: after all, 
“Indians like all other citizens share allegiance to the overriding 
sovereign, the United States.”93  Any other authority a tribe 
possesses “comes from the consent of its members, and so . . . 
marks the bounds of tribal authority.”94 
A. United States v. Lara: Background and Procedural History 
1. District Court 
Billy Jo Lara is a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of 
Chippewa Indians in North Dakota.  He is married to a member 
of the Spirit Lake Tribe and resided with his wife and children on 
the Spirit Lake reservation in North Dakota.95  On June 13, 
2001, while on the Spirit Lake reservation, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs police officers arrested Lara for public intoxication.96  
When the officers informed Lara that there was an exclusion 
order prohibiting him from being on the Spirit Lake reservation, 
 
 89 Id. at 19 (citing Tracy Labin, We Stand United Before the Court: The Tribal 
Supreme Court Project, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 695, 697 (2003)). 
 90 Paul Eldridge, available at http://www.worldofquotes.com/author/Paul-
Eldridge/1/index.html. 
 91 See United States v. Lara, 294 F. 3d 1004, 1006 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Cooper v. 
Aaron, 385 U.S. 1, 18, (1958)), reh’g en banc granted and rev’d by 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 
2003), cert. granted and en banc opinion rev’d by 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 92 Resnik, supra note 7, at 115. 
 93 Skibine, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. at 775 (emphasis added). 
 94 Id. 
 95 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004). 
 96 United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 636 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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Lara struck one of them with his fist.97  The Spirit Lake tribe 
charged Lara with five violations of the Sprit Lake Tribal Code, 
including violence to a policeman.98  However, Lara had another 
problem on his hands: Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) officers 
are not only tribal officers, but also federal officers.  Thus, when 
Lara punched the BIA officer, he opened the door to federal 
prosecution as well.99  This is precisely what occurred: a federal 
grand jury indicted Lara for assault on a federal officer, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1).100  Lara moved to dismiss the 
indictment, claiming that the federal charges violated the Double 
Jeopardy clause101 and impermissible selective prosecution.102  
The magistrate judge denied the motion, and Lara entered a 
guilty plea on the condition that he could seek appellate review of 
his motion to dismiss the indictment.103 
2. United States Court of Appeals, Round 1: 2002 
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Lara’s motion to 
dismiss the indictment.104  The court cited the “separate 
sovereigns” doctrine, under which a tribal court and the federal 
government may prosecute a defendant for the same conduct if 
the tribal court and the federal government draw their authority 
from separate sources of power.105  Lara argued to the panel that 
the separate sovereigns doctrine did not apply to his case because 
the tribe that prosecuted him, the Sprit Lake Nation, and the 
federal government both derive their power from the same 
source: the United States Constitution.106  The government 
argued the opposite: “the Spirit Lake Nation draws its authority 
from retained sovereignty, [and] not from a Congressional 
 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See Melissa L. Tatum, Symposium, Tribal Sovereignty and United States v. Lara: 
Symposium Foreword, 40 TULSA L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 100 The language of the statute is as follows: 
Whoever (1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or 
interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while 
engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties . . . shall, where 
the acts in violation of this section constitute only simple assault, be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, and in all other 
cases, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2005). 
 101 “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb.”  U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 102 United States v. Lara, 294 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 1005-06. 
 105 Id. at 1006. 
 106 Id. 
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delegation of power.”107 
Therefore, the government argued that the Sprit Lake 
Nation is a separate sovereign from the federal government and 
both may prosecute Lara under the separate sovereigns 
doctrine.108  The Court of Appeals agreed with the government, 
explaining that, “Duro grounds its holding in federal common 
law, not Constitutional law, because Duro discusses tribal 
sovereignty without reference to the Constitution.”109  
Accordingly, tribal sovereignty is governed by federal common 
law, and the court “must defer to Congress.”110  Turning then to 
Congress’ amendment of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), the 
court concluded that Congress did not intend to expressly 
delegate Congressional authority when it amended the ICRA; 
instead, Congress’ intent was to recognize inherent tribal 
power.111  Thus, since the Sprit Lake tribe drew its power from 
retained sovereignty and the federal government drew its power 
from a different source, Lara’s Double Jeopardy argument 
failed.112 
3. United States Court of Appeals, Round 2: 2003 
After the Court of Appeals’ 2002 decision, Lara petitioned for 
a rehearing en banc.113  The Court of Appeals granted Lara’s 
petition and reversed the panel’s 2002 decision.114  The court 
recognized that the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Enas, held 
that Duro was a common law decision and thus Congress had the 
power to override it by amending the Indian Civil Rights Act.115  
The court also noted that the Enas court, “conceded that 
sovereignty has ‘constitutional implications’” but nevertheless 
decided that Duro was a common law decision.116  The Court of 
Appeals went on to respectfully disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Enas, concluding instead that, “the distinction 
between a tribe’s inherent and delegated powers is of 
constitutional magnitude and therefore is a matter ultimately 
entrusted to the Supreme Court.  Absent a delegation from 
 
 107 Id. at 1006. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 1007.  See also Duro, 495 U.S. at 676. 
 110 Lara, 294 F.3d at 1007. 
 111 Id.  See also United States v. Weaselhead, 36 F. Supp. 2d  908, 913 (Neb. 1997), 
quoting H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-261, at 3-4 (1991) (“Indian tribal-governments have 
retained the criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians and [the Indian Civil Rights 
Act amendment] is not a delegation of this jurisdiction but a clarification.”). 
 112 Lara, 294 F.3d at 1007. 
 113 United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 114 Id. at 640-41. 
 115 Id. at 639 (citing United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1115 (2002)). 
 116 Id. (quoting Enas, 255 F.3d at 673). 
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Congress, a tribe’s powers are those ‘inherent powers of a limited 
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.’”117 
4. United States Supreme Court 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
decide “whether Congress has the constitutional power to relax 
restrictions that the political branches have, over time, placed on 
the exercise of a tribe’s inherent legal authority.”118  The Court 
decided that Congress does possess such power and Lara’s 
conviction was therefore not barred by the Double Jeopardy 
clause.119  At first glance, this decision seems to be somewhat of a 
victory for tribes since it reaffirms the Duro fix, which allows 
tribes criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians who 
commit crimes on tribal land.120  The Court’s ultimate conclusion, 
that tribes retain such criminal jurisdiction over non-member 
Indians, is proper in that it does give tribes a small amount of 
control over what happens within tribal borders. However, the 
Court’s reasoning is flawed and a deeper examination leads to 
the conclusion that both the Court and Congress wish Indian 
tribes to remain virtually powerless to control relations, both 
within their borders and outside of their reservations’ physical 
boundaries. 
In reaching its decision, the Court broke its rationale into six 
elements: First, the Indian Commerce and Treaty Clauses gave 
Congress plenary and exclusive authority to write and pass laws 
with regard to Indian tribes.121  Second, Congress had 
interpreted those “‘plenary’ grants of power as authorizing it to 
enact legislation that restricts and” relaxes tribal powers.122  
Third, Congress’ goal of altering “the degree of autonomy” of a 
dependent sovereign that is not a State is a familiar legislative 
objective.123  Fourth, Lara did not point to any language in the 
Constitution suggesting that there is a limit on Congress’ 
“authority to relax restrictions on tribal” powers.124  Fifth, the 
power that Congress “reinvested” in the tribes was similar to a 
tribe’s powers to prosecute its own members, which makes the 
 
 117 Id. at 639 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S 313, 322(1978)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 118 Lara, 541 U.S. at 196. 
 119 Id. at 197, 210. 
 120 See Kevin K. Washburn, Lara, Lawrence, Supreme Court Litigation, and Lessons 
from Social Movements, 40 TULSA L. REV. 25, 25, 28(2004). 
 121 Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.  See also, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands and 
Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71, (1979) (“Congress in the exercise of its 
plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs . . . .”); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. 
 122 Lara, 541 U.S. at 202. 
 123 Id. at 203. 
 124 Id. at 204. 
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change at issue limited.125  Finally, the idea that Congress 
possessed the power to relax restrictions on tribes’ inherent 
prosecutorial authority was consistent with decisions in other 
Supreme Court cases.126 
B. What’s Wrong With this Picture? 
The doctrine of inherent sovereignty in federal Indian law 
holds that “tribes are domestic dependent nations which may 
exercise powers free of the strictures of the Constitution unless 
limited by treaty or Congress.”127  The idea of inherent 
sovereignty stems from the Marshall trilogy, which limited tribes 
in two areas: the ability (or lack thereof) to convey land, and the 
inability to deal as foreign nations to create treaties with the 
United States.128  Essentially, “Native Americans were mere 
occupiers with an individuality not subject to the laws of the 
federal government but not completely independent of them 
either.”129  The doctrine of inherent sovereignty is troubling in 
and of itself because if tribes are sovereign, or were ever meant to 
be treated as such, they should not be “mere occupiers,” or 
“dependent nations,” which are subject to the mercy of Congress.  
Indian tribes are not sovereign, autonomous, or independent; 
Indian tribes are more accurately described as dependent 
nations. 
At issue in Lara is the separate sovereign doctrine, an 
exception to the Double Jeopardy clause, in which multiple 
governmental units may prosecute a defendant for the same 
conduct if those governmental units draw their authority from 
separate sources of power.  The fundamental concept underlying 
the separate sovereigns doctrine is “sovereigns.”  If Indian tribes 
draw their authority to prosecute Indians who commit crimes on 
tribal land from a source other than their own inherent power, 
then tribes are not sovereign. 
The Supreme Court has previously held that when an Indian 
tribe prosecutes its own members, it is acting as a separate 
sovereign.130  The Court also found that when a tribe prosecuted 
 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 205. 
 127 L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 810 (1996). 
 128 Id. 
 129 April L. Seibert, Note, Who Defines Tribal Sovereignty?  An Analysis of United 
States v. Lara, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 393, 394 (2003/2004) (emphasis added). 
 130 Lara, 541 U.S. at 199.  See also Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 318, 322-23 (1978) (a tribe’s 
“sovereign power to punish tribal offenders,” while subject to congressional “defeasance,” 
remains among those “‘inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been 
extinguished’” (emphasis added and deleted)). 
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a member or a non-member Indian, its source of power to do so 
was the tribe’s own inherent power; thus, it was acting as a 
separate sovereign.131  However, by analyzing whether Congress 
has the power to relax restrictions placed on the exercise of a 
tribe’s inherent legal authority by political branches, one must 
necessarily conclude that tribes are not regarded by either 
Congress or the Supreme Court as sovereign, and they do not 
possess any authority without either the Constitution or 
Congress granting them such authority.   
C. Problems with the Lara Factors 
1. If Congress Has Plenary Power over Indian Tribes They 
Cannot Be Independent Sovereigns 
The Court reasoned that the Constitution, via the Indian 
Commerce and Treaty Clauses, gives Congress “plenary and 
exclusive” power to legislate with regard to Indian tribes.132  
Second, Congress has interpreted those plenary grants of power 
as authorizing it to enact legislation that restricts and relaxes 
tribal powers.133  The plenary powers doctrine has been the 
source of much agony for Indian tribes in the United States 
“because of its potential to allow Congress to obliterate tribal 
governments and treaties.”134 
“[T]he sovereignty of the tribes is subject to exceptionally 
great powers of Congress to regulate and modify the status of 
tribes.”135  With regard to Indians, Congress has authorized 
different policies at different times throughout United States 
history.136  Aside from attempting to define Indian country 
through the Indian Intercourse Act and subsequently through 
steps to provide Indians with their own territories within states, 
Indian tribes are also specifically mentioned in the Indian 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  This clause 
gives Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign 
Nations and among the several states and with the Indian 
tribes.”137  The Indian Commerce Clause is derived from Article 
IX of the Articles of Confederation, which stated that Congress 
has “the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the 
 
 131 Lara, 541 U.S. at 199. 
 132 Id. at 200. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Edwin Kneedler, Indian Law in the Last Thirty Years: How Cases Get to the 
Supreme Court and How They Are Briefed, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 274, 279 (2003). 
 135 William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1987). 
 136 Lara, 541 U.S. at 200. 
 137 Pommersheim, supra note 35, at 273  n.12. 
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trade and managing all affairs with the Indians.”138 
In the early years of the United States, Congress may have 
been well served to interpret the Indian Commerce Clause as 
granting to it the power to regulate all Indian affairs, despite the 
fact that that the clause specifically grants power over only 
Indian commerce.  However, even with changing times and the 
increased purchasing and political power of Indian tribes in this 
country, the Court continues to interpret this clause as not only 
giving Congress the power to regulate trade and commerce with 
the tribes, but also as authority to legislate other issues with 
regard to tribal affairs.139  The problem with this interpretation 
is that “the treaty power does not literally authorize Congress to 
act legislatively,” because it actually gives the President the 
power and authority to make treaties.140 
In 1871, Congress ended the practice of entering into treaties 
with Indian tribes, but the Supreme Court nonetheless stated 
that the statute terminating such power, 25 U.S.C. § 71, “in no 
way affected Congress’ plenary powers to legislate on problems of 
Indians.”141  Congressional policy today still purports to seek 
“greater tribal autonomy within the framework of a ‘government-
to-government relationship.’”142  Yet, Congress has made major 
policy changes with regard to Indians, even in the last fifteen 
years, indicating that tribes are not as autonomous as the 
government makes them out to be.143 
If Congress has plenary and exclusive power to legislate with 
regard to Indian tribes, then tribes are not truly sovereign, 
because they do not possess the ultimate power to decide whether 
they and their members will interact with the federal 
government and various states.  Because Congress gave Indian 
tribes their recognized status within this country, it follows that 
because of its plenary power to legislate with regard to tribes, 
Congress has the power to extinguish tribal status.  If a separate 
body has the complete power to regulate tribal affairs, then tribes 
are not sovereign; instead, they are dependent. 
 
 138 Id. (quoting the Articles of Confederation art XII). 
 139 Id. at 273. 
 140 Lara, 541 U.S. at 201. 
 141 Id. (quoting Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975)). 
 142 Id. at 202 (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. 22951 (April 29, 1994)). 
 143 In the past fifteen years, Congress has, among other things, enacted the Duro fix 
and written multiple laws with regard to Indian gaming.  With the increasing influence 
tribes have on the communities in which they are situated, and therefore on the United 
States itself, the government continues to step in and regulate Indian tribes. 
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2. The Constitution Does Not Give Congress An 
Enumerated Power To Alter Tribal Sovereignty 
The Court in Lara noted that Congress’ statutory goal of 
modifying the degree of autonomy of a dependent sovereign that 
is not a State is a common legislative objective.144  Here again, 
the Court states that Congress may modify a tribe’s degree of 
autonomy within the United States.  As the court in Wheeler 
noted, Indian tribes enjoy a sovereignty that, “exists only at the 
sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.”145  
The Court refers to Indian tribes as “dependent sovereign[s],” 
however, the terms contradict one another.  If a tribe is 
dependent, then it is not truly sovereign.146  Since Congress may 
write laws with regard to tribes’ internal affairs and jurisdiction, 
as well as tribal relations with the government, then Indian 
tribes are not entirely self-governing, even though they possess 
the power to write laws with regard to certain aspects of internal 
tribal affairs.  Thus, they lack true sovereignty. 
The Court states that Lara does not point to any explicit 
language in the Constitution suggesting there is a limit on 
Congressional authority to restrict or relax tribal powers.147  
What the Court does not recognize is that tribal members cannot 
point to explicit language in the Constitution with regard to 
Congress’ authority on tribal affairs, because none exists.  Justice 
Thomas, although concurring in the judgment, notes that “[t]he 
Court utterly fails to find any provision of the Constitution that 
gives Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty.”148  
There are only three places in which the term “Indian” appears 
in the United States Constitution.149  First, it appears in Article I 
regarding apportionment of the House of Representatives.150  
Second, it appears in substantially the same form in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which superseded the Article I 
reference. 151  Finally, the Indian Commerce Clause appears in 
Article I.152 
The Court concedes that the treaty power, which is often 
referred to as a source of Congressional power over tribes, does 
not literally give Congress the authority to legislate with regard 
 
 144 Lara, 541 U.S. at 202. 
 145 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. 
 146 See generally Lara, 541 U.S. at 193. 
 147 Id. at 196. 
 148 Id. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 149 Resnik, supra note 7, at 80. 
 150 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“[E]xcluding Indians not taxed.”). 
 151 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2. 
 152 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 3. 
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to Indian affairs.153  Thus, “it provides no power to Congress, at 
least in the absence of a specific treaty.”154  The treaty power 
problem was prevalent even in the early 1900s, as illustrated in 
Missouri v. Holland.155  Although Holland challenged the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, it provides a good illustration of the 
sovereignty debacle and constitutional problems that plague the 
Lara decision and Indian affairs in general. 
In Holland, Missouri filed a suit against the United States 
game warden to enjoin the United States from trying to enforce 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and certain regulations made by 
the Secretary of Agriculture on the grounds that the statute was 
unconstitutional.156  The state argued that the statute interfered 
with states’ sovereign rights because it provided for specified 
close seasons and other protections for certain species of birds 
that migrated between the United States and Canada.157  The 
Supreme Court held that the Act was constitutional as the 
treaty-making power was expressly delegated to the United 
States under the Treaty clause158 and the Supremacy Clause.159  
However, the decision tells the tale of a power struggle between 
the states and the federal government that is analogous to the 
situation facing Native Americans today. 
Ironically, only six years prior to the Holland decision, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas 
in United States v. Shauver struck down as unconstitutional an 
earlier federal statute regulating migratory birds because 
Congress “attempted by itself and not in pursuance of a treaty to 
regulate the killing of migratory birds within the States.”160  
Despite the fact that the court in Shauver found that migratory 
birds fell under the purview of matters that should be regulated 
by the states, counsel for the Attorney General in Holland 
argued that the government may exercise its powers within the 
various states to the extent necessary, “although they may 
involve an interference with what would otherwise lie exclusively 
within the province of the state.”161  The Supreme Court accepted 
 
 153 Lara, 541 U.S. at 201. 
 154 Id. at 225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 155 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 156 Id. at 430-31. 
 157 Id. at 431. 
 158 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 159 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 160 Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.  See also United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (1914) 
(“The court is unable to find any provision in the Constitution authorizing Congress, 
either expressly or by necessary implication, to protect or regulate the shooting of 
migratory wild game when in a state, and is therefore forced to the conclusion that the act 
is unconstitutional.”). 
 161 Brief for Appellee, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 419 (1920) (No. 609). 
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the government’s argument despite the fact that the government, 
by deviously going through the back door and entering into a 
treaty with Canada, sought to accomplish the same objective it 
attempted to undertake in Shauver.  Counsel for the Appellant in 
Holland, recognizing the irony of the situation, aptly noted that 
[i]f it had even been suggested that, although Congress had no power 
to control the taking of wild game within the borders of any State, yet 
indirectly by means of a treaty with some foreign power it could 
acquire the power and by this means its long arm could reach into the 
States and take food from the tables of their people, who can for one 
moment believe that such a constitution would have been ratified?162 
By the same token, even though the treaty power gives 
Congress no authority to regulate the relationship between tribes 
and the federal government absent a specific treaty, Congress 
uses its long arm to delve into tribal affairs via the treaty power 
and take from tribes that which it has no authority to seize: 
sovereignty. 
If Congress by means of a treaty can tell the people of a State when 
and under what conditions they may take wild game which they own 
in their collective sovereign capacity . . . then . . . they are states in 
name only, and our government a very different government from that 
presupposed and intended by the people who ratified the 
Constitution.163 
Similarly, with regard to tribal self-government, because 
Congress bestowed upon itself the power to legislate with regard 
to Indian affairs and did not leave that task to the tribes, 
Congress does not view the tribes as sovereign.  Instead, 
Congress views the tribes as dependent on the government to 
regulate virtually every aspect of their affairs, something Indians 
likely never pondered and the government, if it views tribes as 
sovereign, should never have contemplated either. 
3. If Congress Has Power To “Reinvest” Tribes With 
Prosecutorial Power, Then The Tribes Are Not 
Sovereign 
The Court states that the power that Congress reinvested in 
the tribes is similar to a tribe’s powers to prosecute its own 
members, which makes the change at issue limited.164  True, the 
change at issue may be limited, but the overreaching powers of 
the Supreme Court and Congress with respect to tribes are not.  
The trouble with Lara is that the Court circumvents the issue 
that has been at the core of Indian law and legislation since 
 
 162 Brief for Appellant, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 418 (1920) (No. 609). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Lara, 541 U.S. at 203. 
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colonization: sovereignty.  Simply because Congress reinvests 
tribes with a power that they already had, or which is similar to 
another power tribes possess, it does not necessarily follow that 
Congress believes that tribes are sovereign.  Limited power does 
not equate to sovereignty. 
The Court states that Congress’ power to relax restrictions 
on tribes’ inherent prosecutorial authority is consistent with 
other Supreme Court cases.165  While this may be the case, it still 
does not mean that Congress and the Supreme Court view tribes 
as separate sovereigns.  This is evidenced by the fact that 
Congress and the Supreme Court decide the laws of Indian 
nations with regard to dealings with the government and non-
Indians.  In fact, Congress, through its 1990 amendment of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act, dictated the way it believed Indians 
should behave with respect to other Indians within Indian 
territory.  Although it is true that prior to the ICRA amendment 
tribes had been exercising authority over nonmember Indians 
who committed crimes on host tribal land, when Congress 
reaffirmed that power, it was essentially dictating to Indian 
tribes what they could or could not legally do with regard to 
nonmember Indians.  Congress, if it had chosen to do so, could 
have refrained from amending the ICRA or amended it 
differently, denying Indian tribes all power to prosecute 
nonmember Indians who commit crimes on host territory. 
D. Double Jeopardy 
The Supreme Court found that Lara’s tribal prosecution and 
subsequent federal prosecution for the same crime did not violate 
the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.166  The 
Double Jeopardy clause provides that no person shall “be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”167  
Under normal circumstances, the Double Jeopardy clause would 
bar Lara’s subsequent federal prosecution.  However, there is an 
exception to the double jeopardy clause: the separate sovereigns, 
or dual sovereignty, doctrine.  This doctrine holds that when an 
individual violates the “peace and dignity” of two sovereigns by a 
single act, that is, they violate the laws of two separate 
sovereigns, there are two distinct offenses.168  Because the Lara 
Court found that Indian tribes possess the inherent sovereignty 
to prosecute nonmember Indians who commit crimes on host 
 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 210. 
 167 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 168 Lara, 541 U.S. at 220 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 
U.S. 82, 88 (1985)). 
BATZER FINAL 6/28/2005 2:16 PM 
297 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 8:275 
tribal land, the Court found that the Sprit Lake Nation was a 
separate sovereign from the federal government.  Thus, the dual 
sovereignty doctrine permitted both the tribal and the federal 
prosecutions.169  However, this conclusion was not without 
criticism.  Justice Thomas, although concurring in the judgment, 
pointed out that confusion and mixed messages are still 
abundant in tribal sovereignty cases.  He noted two diametrically 
opposed assumptions underlying sovereignty cases: First, 
Congress possesses the power to “regulate virtually every aspect 
of the tribes without rendering tribal sovereignty a nullity.”170  
Second, the tribes somehow remain inherently sovereign with the 
ability “to enforce their criminal laws against their own 
members.”171 
Over twenty years ago, the Supreme Court faced the same 
dilemma in United States v. Wheeler.  The Court noted that an 
Indian tribe’s power to punish tribal members who commit 
crimes on tribal land was among the inherent powers of Indian 
tribes.  However, those powers were subject to “complete” 
congressional “defeasance.”172  Even after Congress amended the 
Indian Civil Rights Act in 1990, purporting to “reinvest” Indian 
tribes with the inherent power to prosecute nonmember Indians, 
Congress still holds the puppet strings.  That is, Congress 
ultimately has the power to take away tribes’ authority to 
prosecute both member and nonmember Indians.  Both the Court 
and Congress appear to promote the idea that the Indians’ source 
of power to prosecute criminals is a power derived from inherent 
sovereignty.  However, in reality, this power seems to be a 
delegated federal power.  Justice Kennedy, concurring in the 
Lara judgment, points out that 
[t]he terms of the [amended Indian Civil Rights Act] are best 
understood as a grant or cession from Congress to the tribes, and it 
should not be doubted that what Congress has attempted to do is 
subject American citizens to the authority of an extraconstitutional 
sovereign to which they had not previously been subject.  The 
relaxing-restrictions formulation is further belied by the involvement 
of the United States in all aspects of the tribal prosecution of a non-
member Indian. . . . This does not indicate the sort of detachment from 
the exercise of prosecutorial authority implicit in the description of 
Congress’ Act as having relaxed restrictions.173 
Adding an interesting twist to the plot, both Justice Souter 
and Justice Scalia, who rarely share the same point of view, 
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dissented.  Justice Souter wrote that the majority’s reasoning 
implied that allowing Congress to amend the Indian Civil Rights 
Act was “more like the delegation of lawmaking power to an 
administrative agency, whose jurisdiction would not even exist 
absent congressional authorization.”174  An application of the 
Double Jeopardy doctrine turns on just how far inherent 
jurisdiction extends.175 
Although Indian tribes do have limited powers to punish 
offenders who commit crimes within tribal territory, that power 
is still scrutinized by the ever watchful eye of the federal 
government.  Congress and the Supreme Court still maintain 
that Indian tribes are separate sovereigns, and therefore, when 
an Indian commits a crime on tribal land, both the tribal and 
federal governments may prosecute him without offending the 
Double Jeopardy clause.  Yet, if Congress has the plenary 
authority to disinvest tribes of that power by making it illegal to 
prosecute tribal members or nonmembers for crimes they commit 
on tribal land, then it does not seem to follow that Indian tribes 
are separate sovereigns.  If this is the case, then tribal power is 
delegated federal power, and the Fifth Amendment should bar 
the Court from twice putting Lara in jeopardy. 
There is no way to deny that the United States government 
has extensive power over Indian tribes.  Realistically speaking, 
because tribes are reliant on the federal government, Congress’ 
continual interference with tribal affairs and jurisdictional issues 
is at odds with the tribes’ dependent status and most definitely 
at odds with their independent status.  When Congress enacted 
the Duro fix to reinvest tribes with powers they possessed from 
their inception, Congress gave powers to the tribes that 
dependent bodies cannot really possess.  Hence, Congress 
confused the situation even further with its “largely rhetorical” 
notions of indigenous nation sovereignty and independence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
“The bird a nest, the spider a web, man friendship.”176 
Congress undeniably has the power to regulate Indian tribes, 
controlling a multitude of tribal affairs, both externally, and, to 
some extent, internally.  However, this leads to the conclusion 
that Indian tribes are not sovereign bodies and probably have not 
been since colonization.  The United States government and 
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Indian tribes alike have made progress in leaps and bounds since 
both bodies experienced a head-on collision during the nation’s 
inception.  However, the government, while insisting that Indian 
tribes are sovereign nations, continuously appears to disregard 
their sovereignty by enacting laws that impact the tribes.  If the 
Supreme Court and Congress believe that Indian tribes are 
sovereign, they should treat them as such. 
Tribes have made countless efforts to improve their status 
within this country.  Unfortunately, sometimes those efforts do 
not succeed.  Making improvements, while partially the tribes’ 
responsibility, should also be a priority for the government.  The 
Court and Congress should take the initiative to recognize that 
when they refer to Indian nations as sovereign, they are 
perpetuating a false sense of independence and ability to 
completely self-govern.  Our nation’s law and policymaking 
bodies should reveal their true stance on how they view Indian 
nations. 
Although there is no easy solution to such a deeply-rooted 
historical issue, recognizing that there is a problem, and 
identifying the source of that problem is at least a first step.  
Although “[t]he case before us must be considered in light of our 
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a 
hundred years ago,”177 it still appears that Congress and the 
Supreme Court would rather continue giving lip service to tribal 
sovereignty than come to a resolution that allows the government 
to remain powerful but also allows tribes to preserve an 
independence and heritage that, if destroyed, could drive a stake 
through the rich traditions that are at heart of this nation. 
 
 
 177 Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. 
